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Abstract 
For many observers we are entering an age of heightened disruption in energy systems -  a 
'disruption narrative' is now prominent and seemingly widely-shared. The energy disruption 
narrative often goes beyond the merely descriptive: it is also often used in a normative way, in that 
system disruption is seen as a necessary and welcome enabler of the shift to more sustainable and 
more rapidly decarbonised energy systems. While not denying that there are significant changes 
underway in the operation and governance of energy systems, I reflect here on the assumptions 
associated with the disruption narrative and its value as a guide to policy and research. I firstly 
review some theoretical and empirical research on disruptive innovation, consider some empirical 
evidence on historic energy system change, and then reflect on the value of a disruptive narrative in 
'energy futures' research and policy. The disruption narrative is a contestable framing for 
researchers, across both 'whole systems' analysis and more specific technological and organisational 
level study, and is a problematic guide for policy. Researchers and policymakers should be sceptical 
of uniform narratives about change, and seek more balanced attention to both disruptive and 
continuity-based dynamics of energy system change and sustainable transitions. 
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Introduction 
For many observers we are entering an age of heightened disruption in energy systems – among 
energy professionals and analysts a ‘disruption narrative’ is now prominent and seemingly widely-
shared. The President of the UK Energy Institute recently suggested that ‘today’s energy system is 
undergoing a quiet revolution, driven by an everchanging global political landscape, climate change 
challenges and a range of innovations influencing energy consumption’ (Energy Institute, 2017, p4). 
The International Energy Agency, in its most recent analyses of global energy system change, has 
concluded that this is ‘a momentous period for global energy’ (IEA, 2016) and ‘the energy mix is 
being redefined’ (IEA, 2017). The consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers has articulated a vision 
of rapid and dramatic change: ‘the pace of technology-driven change is accelerating well beyond the 
speed the power sector believed possible. From a scale-driven, centralised and standardised model, 
the sector is set to evolve to one that is digital, distributed and personalised’ (PwC, 2016). 
The energy disruption narrative often goes beyond the merely descriptive: it is also often used in a 
normative way, in that system disruption is seen as a necessary and welcome enabler of the shift to 
more sustainable and more rapidly decarbonised energy systems, and an essential means of 
escaping the locked-in unsustainabilities of incumbent systems. This carries significant policy and 
regulatory implications: it implies that policymakers and regulators should seek to actively unleash 
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disruptive forces (perhaps by destabilising and dismantling incumbent interests) so as to clear the 
path for the sustainability transition. 
While not denying the significant changes underway in the operation and governance of energy 
systems, I want to reflect here on the assumptions associated with the disruption narrative and its 
value as a guide to policy and research. I firstly consider the theoretical and empirical background to 
disruptive innovation, consider some historic empirical evidence on energy system change and then 
the value of a disruptive narrative in ‘energy futures’ research and policy. I will argue that the 
disruptive innovation is a disputable framing for researchers, across both ‘whole systems’ analysis 
and more specific technology- and organisational-level study, and is a problematic guide for policy. I 
conclude that energy systems researchers and policymakers should be sceptical of uniform 
narratives about change, and should offer more balanced attention to both disruptive and 
continuity-based dynamics of energy system change and sustainable transitions.  
In their benchmark collection of research on energy technology innovation, Charlie Wilson and 
Arnulf Grubler (Wilson and Grubler, 2014, p.7) define ‘radical’, ‘breakthrough’ and ‘disruptive’ 
innovations as those novelties that strongly deviate from prevailing technological and institutional 
norms, while ‘incremental’ or ‘continuous’ innovations are defined as improvements without any 
fundamental novelty in end-use service provision. Although these definitions capture the essence of 
research and policy debates on disruptiveness, they also reflect the compound and ambiguous 
character of the objects of analysis here, spanning a mix of social & technical, and upstream & 
downstream concerns. Rather than aiming explicitly at any more precise definition of disruptive and 
continuous innovation (an ultimately futile pursuit given the multiplicities of voices and framings 
involved), my aim here is to explore the tensions and problems involved in their application – 
ambiguities which were evident in the workshops which were the genesis for this series of articles 
(Wilson, 2017).   
Theoretical and Empirical Backgrounds 
Disruptive and radical innovation are longstanding preoccupations in applied social sciences such as 
innovation studies, technology studies, organisation studies and business studies. Much of this 
research is focused on firms and organisations rather than larger systems, and much of it takes its 
inspiration (knowingly or implicitly) from Joseph Schumpeter’s work in the early and mid-twentieth 
century. Schumpeter understood broad patterns of industrial and economic change as reflecting a 
‘perennial gale of creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1994 [1942]).  
The most prominent recent contributor to disruptive innovation research has been Clayton 
Christensen. In his ‘Innovator’s Dilemma’ (Christensen 1997), Christensen argued that it was 
profoundly difficult for incumbent firms to direct sustained effort and resource on disruptive 
innovation. Firm capabilities, forged within ‘value networks’, are deeply oriented to ‘sustaining 
innovation’, and are more specialised and path dependent than is commonly assumed. Disruptive 
technologies present intrinsic conflicts – they rarely ‘make sense’ to large established companies – 
and so tend be left to small outsider firms to develop.  
Christensen’s thesis has been repeatedly challenged; Daneels (2004), for example, criticised it for a 
selective reading of empirical evidence, for only picking 'winning' disruptive technologies and for 
overstating the innovative inertia of incumbent firms. It has also been widely misapplied –  
Christensen et al. (2015) recently stated that ‘disruption theory is in danger of becoming a victim of 
its own success … the theory’s core concepts have been widely misunderstood and its basic tenets 
frequently misapplied’.  
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Nevertheless, the thesis still often sets the terms for contemporary debate on disruptive innovation, 
with many other relevant studies over the past 30 years often left unreferenced. Rather like 
Christensen et al.’s recent contribution, much of this under-examined work seeks a more nuanced 
and heterogeneous account of innovation, spanning both disruptive and continuity-based dynamics. 
Contributors here can be traced back to well before Christensen’s debate-defining account. Many of 
the theoretical claims involved are based on detailed longitudinal studies of multiple firms and 
industry sectors; a few such studies are now briefly reviewed. 
Abernathy and Clark (1985) suggested that disruptive innovation was a problematic and ambiguous 
term. Rather than any universal or essentialist properties, disruptive innovation forces were highly 
relative and situated, and analysis needed to consider their varied influence on producers, users and 
markets. Drawing on innovation patterns in the US auto industry, Abernathy and Clark distinguished 
between ‘architectural innovations’ (which are both technologically and socially disruptive), and 
‘regular innovation’ (which builds on established competences). The latter, they concluded, although 
‘almost invisible’, can have a dramatic cumulative effect. Although the analytical gaze tended to be 
drawn to novel innovations, novelty (and scientific advance more generally) may carry less 
significance, over time, than relatively mundane changes. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) noted that technological discontinuities were not necessarily 
organisationally disruptive – indeed some could be ‘competence enhancing’. Based on detailed 
longitudinal studies of computing, cement and airline industries, they concluded that such were the 
varieties and complexities of innovation dynamics at firm and sector level, disruptive innovations 
(and dominant designs) could only be identified in retrospect. Anderson and Tushman (1990) 
distinguished between eras of ferment and incrementalism, and considered how some organisations 
were able to develop ‘ambidextrous’ competences to prosper in both. Tushman and Rosenkopf 
(1992) saw discontinuities as ‘rare and unpredictable’, and again, not knowable in advance. 
Some analysts offer more explicit criticism of Schumpterian-based accounts of economic and 
technological change. For the technology historian David Edgerton much scholarship is uncritically 
focussed on novelties, with an ‘enormous rhetorical emphasis’ on innovation in studies of public 
technology policy (Edgerton, 2010). (For a ‘long history’ of the emergence and deployment of the 
term ‘innovation’, see Godin, 2010). For Edgerton (2010) such accounts offered a ‘narrow 
progressivism’, with innovation-deterministic theory often standing in for detailed empirical study. 
Schumpeterian-based economic and technology histories, he concluded, were often ‘absurdly’ 
innovation-centric. Paul Edwards (2003) has also been critical of the preoccupation with novelty and 
emergence in much technology studies. 
As readers of this journal are likely to be aware, these debates are also played out in more 
contemporary (and futures oriented) innovation studies debates, especially sustainable transition 
studies. Disruptive innovation plays an important role in transitions theory, reflecting its origins in 
constructivist sociology and evolutionary economics (Schot and Geels, 2008; Paredis, 2011; Winskel 
and Radcliffe, 2014). For example, Andrew Van de Ven et al.’s ‘Innovation Journey’ (Van de Ven et 
al., 1999), an important influence on transitions theory, explicitly invoked Schumpeterian ‘creative 
destruction’ in developing their emergent model of innovation. For Van der Ven and many other 
innovation studies theorists, the key actor perspective is that of the disruptive entrepreneur or niche 
firm, rather than any wider institutionalist or structuralist perspective. 
Although later versions of transitions theory have been more attendant to wider societal structures 
and institutions, many transitions theorists still often presuppose that disruptiveness is a necessary 
requirement for system innovation (e.g. Voß et al., 2009), with incumbents typically defined by their 
commitment to inherently limited incrementalism (e.g. Markard et al, 2012). It should also be noted 
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that some transitions scholarship has recognised that the technological and organisational 
constitution of disruptiveness (and the role of incumbents in transitions) varies greatly according to 
context (e.g. Raven, 2007; Geels et al., 2016). 
Another prominent strand of sustainable innovation studies, Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) 
theory, also has its origins in evolutionary understandings of innovation which emphasise firm-level 
variation and selection (Nill and Kemp, 2009). According to Suurs and Hekkert (2012: 154) for all 
‘quasi-evolutionary theories’ (listed as strategic niche management, the multi-level perspective, 
technology innovation systems and transition management), ‘a transition is regarded as a regime 
shift … through an accumulation of niches that interact with a destabilizing regime’ (emphasis 
added). 
From an energy systems perspective, the suitability of Schumpeterian based accounts for closely 
coupled and network-based systems needs to be questioned. In Van de Ven’s terms (Van de Ven et 
al., 1999), such systems may be thought of as being heavily conditioned to convergent rather than 
divergent innovation (i.e. based around standards and inter-operability). Tushman and Rosenkopf 
(1992) noted that innovation in systems-based technologies had a distinctive emphasis on hierarchy. 
Raven (2007) suggested that given their tight coupling and high entry barriers, regime hybridisation 
(rather than niche accumulation) may be the route for system change in infrastructure-based 
technologies; as Robert Fri noted, innovation in such sectors is typically ‘incremental, cumulative and 
assimilative’ (Fri, 2003).  
This is not to deny that energy system lock-in and path dependency can present barriers for 
sustainable innovations and transitions. System lock-in is a well-recognised concern among some 
technology systems historians and theorists. Thomas Hughes (1983) noted that as socio-technical 
systems became surrounded by supportive institutional, legislative and financial arrangements they 
developed an in-built conservativeness, and an orientation to incrementalism. Arnold Pacey (1983) 
recognised that bureaucracies tended to develop a characteristically incremental pattern of 
technological change, but noted also that there were ‘crucial moments of recognition’ when a varied 
collection of different factors fit together and a new form of practice takes off.   
 
Rather than taking sides in a polarised debate based on disruption and continuity, the broad insights 
offered by scholars such as Hughes and Pacey relate to theoretical caution and analytical scepticism, 
based on a deep commitment to empirical inquiry. Pacey (1983) warned against the use of any 
essentialist or determinist notions such as 'technological imperatives' enrolled to support or oppose 
particular developments; such claims, he suggested, often served political purposes and were in-part 
an expression of values and interests – including the interests of some innovators to promote their 
work.   
 
Paul Nightingale has argued that ‘Chandlerian accumulation’ rather that ‘Schumpeterian destruction’ 
is a more accurate characterisation of change in industries characterised by scale, inertia and 
regulation (see, for example, Nightingale and Martin, 2004; Nightingale and Mahdi, 2005). Like 
Pacey, Nightingale has invited analysts to consider what may lie behind claims for disruptiveness, 
and how disruptive narratives could serve particular interests. For example, for national 
governments, a focus on small firm entrepreneurship and radical innovation may divert attention 
from inadequate support for more mundane, incremental (but potentially more impactful) support 
programmes. While inflated expectations, optimism biases and hype are required techniques for 
entrepreneurs and small firms, as they strive to command attention and resources, they should be 
treated with scepticism by more independent analysts, regulators and policymakers. 
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A body of more recent infrastructure transitions scholarship has sought to align the Hughesian 
tradition of deep histories of socio-technical systems with contemporary concerns for sustainability 
and energy innovation (e.g. Högselius et al., 2013). Based on a historical analysis of European 
electricity and gas infrastructure development, Van der Vleuten and Högselius (2012) called for a 
‘symmetrical analysis’ of regime stability and change in transitions studies, rather than any ex-ante 
commitment to disruptiveness and regime overthrow, with futures oriented analysis attending to 
how scenarios of change placed greater or lesser emphasis on disruption and continuity (or 
incumbency and new entrants). 
 
Energy innovation dynamics 
 
Studies of both historical trends and more recent changes (including low carbon innovations) 
suggest that continuity-based dynamics often play an important role in energy innovation, at both 
organisation and systems levels. At an organisational level, for example, Stenzel and Frenzel (2008) 
reported a spectrum of proactive, reactive and resistive responses to new technologies among 
European utilities. Combining transitions and technology strategy literatures in a study of the heavy 
vehicle industry, Berggren et al. (2015) found a diversity of strategies among incumbents, with some 
able to take positions in niches while simultaneously retaining their established activities. 
 
Bergek et al. (2013) also found a diversity of incumbent responses in transport and energy sectors, 
noting that this confounded assumptions of incumbent inertia and resistance based on 
Schumpeterian theory. Discontinuities seldom led to creative destruction, they concluded; instead, 
Keith Pavitt’s concept of ‘creative accumulation’ offered a more accurate account of change in some 
sectors. Bergek et al (2013) called for more research on creative accumulation, in terms of the 
dynamic integration of old and new competences.  
 
Drawing on the corporate strategy literature, Bowen (2011) identified a mix of ‘sustaining’ and 
‘disruptive’ technology propositions within a single energy technology field such as carbon capture 
and storage (CCS), according to the particularities of technology design and an organisation’s 
position on the supply chain. Although CCS is usually considered a ‘sustaining innovation’ in 
Christensen’s terms (and has therefore received very little attention within transitions research, 
other than as a reactive response by incumbents to regime destabilisation pressures), Bowen argued 
that one form of CCS – pre-combustion capture technology – has disruptive potential, in terms of its 
links to the hydrogen economy, thereby redefining the trajectory of the energy sector. 
 
In their longitudinal study of lighting, Franceschinia and Alkemade (2016) highlighted the different 
dynamics of innovation associated with different technologies (fluorescent, compact fluorescent, 
and LED). LED technology, though it has changed the technological regime in the lighting industry –
as well as having a step-change impact on energy demand and GHG emissions from lighting services 
– was described as an example of a relatively non-disruptive innovation, in terms of its effects on 
markets and firm strategies, and its strong links to related industries. 
 
There is also some quantitative evidence that continuity-based innovations such as process 
efficiencies, fuel switching, technology substitution and end use efficiency can have dramatic 
cumulative impact on energy systems over time. For example, such changes have been important 
factors behind the very substantial reductions in UK carbon emissions over the past 30 years. 
Overall, UK GHG missions are now 42% below 1990 levels, while over the same period the economy 
has grown by over 60% (CCC, 2015). Between 1990 and 2009, improved conversion efficiencies and 
fuel switching led to a reduction in effective UK electricity sector CO2 emissions of 36.5% (DECC 
2010). Average household energy use in the UK (mainly associated with buildings’ heating) has fallen 
by almost 30% between 2004 and 2015, largely as a result of improved buildings insulation and the 
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roll-out of more efficient gas boilers (UKERC / CIED, 2017). Public policy support for rather mundane 
innovations has been central. 
Finally, there is also some evidence supporting continuity-based public innovation programmes. For 
example, Richard Newell’s review of decades of US federal RD&D energy investments highlighted 
the powerful impact of continuity-based innovation programmes over time (Newell, 2011). In areas 
such as resource extraction and processing, engine efficiencies and industrial process efficiencies, 
decades of incremental change had led to major productivity gains and significantly reduced the 
costs of pollution abatement. Newell attributed this to the successful leveraging of incumbent 
interests and resources. By comparison, more radically oriented programmes, such as on synthetic 
fuels, had produced much less impact.  
 
Prospective studies 
Going beyond any single dominant narrative about energy system futures reveals a wide-ranging 
contemporary debate among innovation theorists on the merits of different styles of energy 
innovation governance – including greater or lesser emphasis placed on disruption and continuity. In 
their survey of research policy since the early 2000s, Winskel and Radcliffe (2014) distinguished 
between niche-based, continuity-based and breakthrough governance prescriptions. For example, 
Perrow (2010) argued that while decentralised approaches were appropriate for some parts of the 
energy system (such as energy efficiency) a centralised top-down approach was appropriate for 
large-scale technologies such as carbon capture and storage.  
 
Konrad et al. (2007) considered prospective regime dynamics for utility industries. In doing so, they 
explicitly questioned the regime-overthrow account of transitions, suggesting that this was likely to 
be especially restricting for future-oriented research: ‘we should not presuppose that a regime shift 
is necessarily the one best way’ (Konrad et al., 2007, p. 1192). Gregory Unruh (2002) concluded that 
under high carbon lock-in, disruption-based strategies were less likely to bring about rapid change 
than more continuity-based approaches (see also Hargadon, 2010). 
 
A number of analysts suggest a portfolio of measures combining continuity and disruption, evolving 
over time (e.g. Unruh and Carmillo Hermosilla, 2006; Weiss and Bonvillian, 2009; Lester and Hart, 
2012). The complex interdependencies of systems are likely to present difficulties here, in terms of 
allowing for both regime stabilisation and destabilisation, and progressing both established and 
radical innovations. Walker (2002, 9834) noted the ambiguous nature of system lock-in, in that it is 
both a ‘dangerous’ but ‘essential’ facet of complex infrastructure innovation. 
 
There is also an emerging emphasis on hybrid combinations of the old and new in transitions 
scholarship. Markard and Hoffmann (2015) developed a typology of complementarities between 
established and emerging industries, to systematise understanding of how new industries may 
emerge from the old, in terms of changed selection environments, links between industries and 
knowledge bases, and complementarities (financial, knowledge and human). Makitie et al. (2016) 
analysed the complementarities between established and emergent energy industries such as 
between oil and gas and offshore windpower.  
 
A number of scenario studies have explicitly addressed the issue of incumbency and disruption. For 
example, Kemp (2011) distinguished between disruptive and sustaining innovations, with some 
technology fields pre-assigned (e.g. CCS as a sustaining innovation and smart grids as disruptive).  
These ex-ante typologies may be questioned in light of the discussion above, in that they risk 
essentialist and determinist outcomes, with incumbency hardwired to limited incrementalism, and 
with analysis rendered insensitive to more heterogeneous roles. Scenario designs which allow for 
7 
 
more permeable relationships are needed here, better reflecting the ambiguities and 
unpredictabilities of innovation.  
 
In this context it is useful to study energy scenario practice, both historically and as pursued more 
recently since the rise of climate change concerns. One of the striking findings from McDowall et al.’s 
(2014) post-hoc review of UK energy scenarios was the unexpectedness of change, in that actual 
developments often lay outside the ranges of imagined futures: developments considered highly 
unlikely can and do materialise. Because scenario exercises tend to reflect the prevailing forces and 
interests at the time of their development, important drivers were often downplayed or overlooked, 
especially ‘softer’ aspects such as institutional or governance changes.  
 
For McDowall et al. (2014) this implied more attention to the range and character of uncertainties 
referenced in scenario exercises, and the tools and techniques involved. Historical ‘successes’ in the 
use of scenarios had tended to be achieved through opening up dialogue on energy priorities, by 
challenging established thinking and creating plausible alternative narratives. Methodologically, this 
required processes to incorporate a diverse range of stakeholders and experts to articulate and 
contest energy system goals and choices. McDowall et al. (2014) also noted the substantial 
accumulated evidence on cognitive biases and limits (such as availability heuristics, conjunction 
fallacies and framing, elaboration and confirmation biases) which shape any individual or collective 
view of the future.  
 
The UK Climate Change Act of 2008 – with its statutory combination of long term decarbonisation 
and step-wise carbon budget limits – presents a forceful institutional setting for energy scenario 
development in the UK. Within this, much recent analysis has turned to the future of buildings 
heating. The CC Act implies a near-wholesale shift away from the dominant form of heating buildings 
– unabated natural gas – by 2050 (Eyre and Baruah, 2014). However, there is no consensus about 
the UK’s low carbon heating transition pathway; rather, there is a range of possible pathways, with 
very varied combinations of disruption and continuity (Carbon Connect, 2014).  
 
For example, the future of the UK’s natural gas national pipeline infrastructure – the incumbent 
system by which heating is currently provided to around 4/5ths of UK homes – is now contested 
between advocates of repurposing and renewal (for example, to allow for a transition to hydrogen-
based heating), and run-down and decommissioning (for example, to allow for a transition to local 
heat networks). There are also significant differences in the envisaged pace and extent of the UK 
heat sector transition, across more gradualist and more transformational visions (CCC, 2016; Lowes 
et al., 2016; Policy Exchange, 2016).  
 
Winskel (2014) reviewed a number of recent UK energy system and buildings heating scenarios. In 
the early period after the CC Act, a radical vision for the future of heating was established among 
mainstream, ‘official’ analysts in the UK Government and the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), 
involving the near wholesale electrification of heating by 2050, using analysis based largely on whole 
systems modelling studies. Under a combination of more detailed modelling and emerging evidence 
from field trials and early deployment, this radical blueprint was soon challenged, and more recent 
scenarios have tended to greater technological diversity, including mature technologies or hybrid 
combinations of the old and new (see also Eyre and Baruah, 2014). Winskel (2014) concluded that 
the case showed the constructive role, in scenario development, of dissident visions which 
challenged mainstream consensus views. 
 
In their analysis of UK heat futures Eyre and Baruah (2014) noted the need for alternative scenarios 
which together spanned a broad uncertainty space. Using a combination of expert judgement and 
infrastructure modelling, Eyre and Baruah devised contrasting combinations of some key 
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sociotechnical variables, spanning not just the energy system but also wider socio-economic 
uncertainties. Like others, they recommended that in a context of high-level uncertainties, emerging 
path dependencies and prospective lock-ins and lock-outs, policy should be aimed at opening-up 
options and diversifying risk – suggesting a combination of more established and more emergent 
innovations. 
 
Conclusions  
Verbong and Loorbach (2012) noted a shift in energy transition dynamics from futurology, scenarios 
and visions, to a material phase characterised by massive actual (and anticipated) investments in 
infrastructure. With greater interests at stake, governments are increasingly concerned to derive 
economic benefit from energy and climate policy. In the UK and elsewhere, focus has turned 
increasingly to ‘industrial strategy’ and ‘clean growth’ as a driver of energy policy. The provisional UK 
Industrial Strategy has a list of energy innovation priorities: smart systems, electric vehicles, battery 
storage technologies and hydrogen systems (BEIS, 2017).  
A UK Parliament committee has expressed concern for the kinds of decision-making involved here: 
an emphasis on ‘picking winners’ through sector-specific initiatives and deals, rather than an 
overarching approach to societal problems (HoC, 2017). In the meantime, more immediate policy 
priorities – related to buildings insulation, energy efficiency and shorter term measures to reduce 
transport sector emissions – have been neglected (CCC, 2017; UKERC / CIED, 2017).  
The same parliamentary committee noted the risk, associated with industrial strategy based policy-
making, that proposals will tend to reflect incumbents’ interests, given the implicit biases involved 
(HoC, 2017). Kemp (2011) also noted that information asymmetries and policy capture can result in 
narrow, interest based policy and regulation. Yet this is not just a danger in policymakers’ relations 
with incumbent interests – it applies also to niche- and disruptive-based interests.  
Energy systems are undergoing substantial changes. In a context of heightened ambitions and 
urgency, however, there is a danger of privileging some dynamics above others. Kuzemko et al. 
(2016) distinguished between ‘forces for sustainability’ and ‘forces for continuity’, but this risks 
overlooking an important middle-ground in a spectrum of continuity and disruption, within which 
incumbents (and continuity-based innovation) are admitted a range of possible roles.  
Preoccupation with disruptiveness as an energy transitions strategy risks marginalising and 
overlooking other important aspects of energy system change: mundane, incremental and 
continuity-based innovation, and possibilities for adapting existing systems. Ultimately, as many of 
the issues here can only be judged retrospectively, we need to be cautious, pragmatic and 
provisional in our assessments. As James Meadowcroft (2009) suggested, our ultimate concern 
should be solving societal problems rather than ‘tilting at systems’.  
Theories matter because they shape analytical attention and the terms of research-policy debate. 
Now more than ever, independent research needs to be based on evidence and open-minded 
enquiry, rather than prefigured framings and received wisdoms. Given that we are all ‘boundedly 
rational’ and cognitively biased, this also means exposing our working assumptions and theories to 
contestation, counter-factual evidence and invited challenge, and to reflect a diversity of evidence 
and views in our prescriptions for policy.  Adapting Van der Vleuten and Högselius (2012), there is a 
need for ‘symmetrically sceptical’ responses to both disruptive and continuity based narratives; by 
itself, the disruptive innovation narrative offers a very poor guide to research and policy.  
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